Inexact Science

KIEV, Ukraine -- Bismarck called politics an inexact science – a very exact definition. This science, as old as sin, has no oracles or unchangeable rules. It is world of lasting interests, not friends. The prime interest is power – the only and absolute constant. Power is an end in itself.

Viktor Baloha
The secession of Viktor Baloha [Presidential Secretariat Chief] and six other members of the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense from the pro-presidential bloc, the parliament’s continued blockade, the tongue-lashing that the Prime Minister received in public from the President, and another sweeping wave of dismissals in the Interior Ministry stem from the same root and clearly indicate the top leadership’s incompetence.

“For the first time in the country’s independent history, the president, the government, and the parliamentary majority are like-minded and united leaders who share common democratic values. For the first time, the three centers of power have the same views, goals, and approaches. For the first time, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches will interact organically and non-violently for essential reforms.” This is what the Orange leaders said when allying in the coalition. They promised to learn the lessons of their past mistakes.

Today the highest echelons demonstrate anything but unity. Contradictions between the President and the Prime Minister get deeper and more acute from day to day; the parliament ignores both; neither can lean on the coalition's majority. The camp of Orange companions is again plagued and pestered by intrigues, suspicion, jealousy, and rivalry. Their loud declarations of legislative and economic reforms are drowning in the bog of wrangles and mutual accusations.

This is the most nonsensical power structure in all Ukraine's years of independence: the opposition has no power de jure but wants to regain it; the ruling coalition has no power de facto but does not want to give up the last remainders of it. The blocked parliament is not the cause but the symbol of this political paralysis.

There is an interesting and very plausible version: it is Baloha who put parliament out of operation. Allegedly, it was his idea to send the notorious letter to the NATO Secretary General [requesting support for Ukraine’s bid to join the Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest summit in April]. Allegedly, it was Baloha who talked Parliament Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk into signing that letter. And it was Baloha who kept it all under wraps until the last minute.

Why? He knew how the opposition would react. He knew that the pro-NATO majority would stand its ground. He knew that parliament would be automatically paralyzed. He needed a disabled parliament, with scuffles at the rostrum, as an ideal background for any provocative presumptions.

The presumption of inconsistency of parliamentarianism in general and this parliament in particular would be a good pretext for raising the question of enhancing the presidential powers, dissolving parliament, or forming a grand coalition.

Whether these allegations are true or not, the reality is that parliament is paralyzed. Even if the opposition lifts the blockade tomorrow, it may well resort to this means again and again. Does the coalition have any effective “anti-jamming” tools? No. Will its members vote as one for bills initiated by Bankova (on abolishing MP immunity, on the imperative mandate, on the Cabinet of Ministers, on national referenda, on the National Guards, etc.)? No.

Ridiculous as it may sound, the parliament’s blockade plays into the hand of the coalition majority. This “timeout” delays the moment when they have to make hard decisions and conceals their disarray. The Orange coalition exists only on paper. The latest and brightest example was the long-awaited and much debated bill on purchases for the State Reserve: the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Regions Party voted for it as one while the OU-PSD faction demonstratively rejected it.

If you look at the list of bills on the parliament’s agenda, you can easily see quite a few issues on which the OU-PSD and the RP are likely to be unanimous. There are also quite a few points of friction between the RP and the Tymoshenko Bloc. However, there is hardly a bill in this list for which the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko factions would vote unanimously.

This situation suits everyone partly and no one in principle. That is why each political force is trying to make the best and most of this pause in the lawmaking work. Negotiations among potential allies are in full swing. They may utterly dislike one another, but if they have to violate their personal views for power, it is worth all the candles and burnt bridges.

The fact that Baloha and his six comrades have seceded from OU-PSD proves once again the coalition’s deep stratification. The Tymoshenko Bloc and the OU-PSD have too different views on policy and economy – both domestic and foreign.

These teams regard each other as rivals in the next possible early parliamentary election. Their leaders regard each other as rivals in the possible early presidential election. They have done nothing to bridge their differences or at least try not to show their dislikes.

That is why it no longer matters on which side this or that member of the coalition is. The key question is whose. Any member of the OU-PSD who does not demonstrate loyalty to Viktor Yushchenko is automatically counted among Tymoshenko’s “secret agents”. His personal opinion does not count.

It is this approach (not Tymoshenko’s “subversive moves”) that has aggravated the conflict within the OU-PSD. Some members of the coalition object to Tymoshenko’s authoritarian style. At the same time, they hate to be silent lambs herded by Yushchenko’s follies or dummies in Baloha’s deal. They are supposed to cement the shaky coalition, but they are coerced into making a choice they don’t have.

In Baloha’s departure, many analysts see an attempt to build a new political platform for Yushchenko in view of a possible early parliamentary election. Others suspect him of stripping the stage for a grand coalition. There is a more logical explanation: firstly, Bankova wants to audit its loyal ranks; secondly, it wants to head off the process of inevitable “schism”. In this game, the first mover forces the opponent to respond.

What Are the Allies After?

Tymoshenko has huge plans, but limited resources. Her initiatives are blocked by the President and she cannot lean on the majority. Paradoxically, her main “reserve” is in the opposition camp and her prime “target” is Viktor Yanukovych. The poor man is gradually losing control of his faction (more and more members of which prefer to work for Rinat Akhmetov rather than their formal leader).

Besides, Akhmetov is now far more welcome than Yanukovych at the presidential headquarters. Tymoshenko, so much disliked by Yanukovych, is his easiest and shortest way back into the top office.

There is one problem: neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych can strike a formal deal. But there is a simple way out: their factions could vote together for the law on the opposition, granting it the right to hold the posts of first vice-Prime Minister and parliament speaker (or first vice speaker). Their factions combined have 331 votes – more than enough to override Yushchenko’s veto.

Then all formalities would be observed, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych would save their reputation, the coalition’s solidity would remain beyond doubt, and the RP would de facto remain in opposition. Both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych would easily substantiate the need to adopt the law.

Thus Yanukovych would get real opportunities to influence the government through his men in top executive posts and Tymoshenko would get a real majority (albeit not formalized) and secure adoption of any bills in defiance of Yushchenko’s vetoes.

This is just one of the possible scenarios which the two opponent forces are scoping out. This process is their natural reaction to the collusion between Bankova and Akhmetov.

Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are also looking for points of contact vis-à-vis Yushchenko’s plan to remake the Constitution, which both dislike. Both are for a strong presidency but are ready to revise their views and draft a common version (which would abolish the presidency or introduce a presidential election by parliament).

If Tymoshenko and Yanukovych struck that deal, they could have the new Constitution adopted by parliament and thus frustrate Yushchenko’s plan to adopt it via national referendum.

Besides, both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych would be able to achieve their tactical goals with minimal electoral losses as they would neither have to stop criticizing each other nor start demonstrating brotherly love.

Many doubt that Tymoshenko would risk an open confrontation with Yushchenko and give up on the idea of a strong presidency, but politics is a science in which anything can be revised. The same concerns Tymoshenko and the Constitution. Being an ardent advocate of the presidency, Tymoshenko changed her views when she was dismissed from the post of Prime Minister.

This is what she said in an interview during the 2006 election campaign: “During the election race in 2002, I campaigned for Our Ukraine not less than for my own party… We won, but you know what a raw deal we got then… I was the only political leader who sacrificed my personal ambitions and sided with Yushchenko in 2004. He won thanks to our support, too… And you know what a raw deal we got…‘I’m not going to step on the same rake again. This time I won’t entrust the fate of the nation to anyone…”

Two years ago, Tymoshenko tried to dissuade Yushchenko from calling a referendum on political reform [the amendments to the Constitution that enhanced the parliament’s and government’s powers at the expense of the president’s]. She said that he would surely lose because “80 percent of Ukrainians would support the political reform”.

Now that the political circumstances have changed, Tymoshenko is again speaking out against the political reform and for stronger presidential powers. Who knows if she might turn the tables again?

Does this mean that the Tymoshenko-Yanukovych alliance is inevitable? – Not at all, considering that politics is an inexact science.

Do Tymoshenko and Yanukovych deserve reprehension for such “separatism”? – Not more than Yushchenko who has long been negotiating with the RP. Yushchenko needs a majority in parliament no less than Tymoshenko. He knows that sooner or later, the OU-PSD will break up and some members of its faction will go over to Tymoshenko's camp.

But he also believes that its majority will remain loyal to him and will support any version of the Constitution and any format of the coalition (even an alliance with the RP) that he proposes. There is a question: is his confidence based only on Baloha’s promises?

Baloha must have convinced Yushchenko that the departure of the seven “dissenters” would speed up the process and help him form a grand coalition.

Meanwhile, OU-PSD is already showing early signs of an imminent breakup. Some members protest against Baloha’s intrigues, against the connivance of Yushchenko’s hare-brained projects, and against Yanukovych’s comeback.

Others prefer to keep dirty linen in the house, believing that it is better to have apparent powers than none. And there are those who will stop at nothing to get their ticket to the bounty land called Power.

The sad fact is that their number is growing day by day.

Source: Zerkalo Nedeli