Tymoshenko Appointment Won't Alter Russia-Ukraine Interdependencies

KIEV, Ukraine -- In her first major comments on relations with Russia, Yulia Tymoshenko, Ukraine's new Prime Minister, last month insisted that she had no intentions of worsening relations with Russia: "I will strive to establish a relationship of equal partnership," she said.

Ukraine's Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko
Although Ukraine held its most recent round of legislative elections on Sept. 30, 2007, it was only on Dec. 18, that the so-called "Orange bloc" parties aligned with President Viktor Yushchenko consolidated their narrow victory by securing the appointment of Tymoshenko, currently the country's most influential and popular politician, as prime minister. Yushchenko had actually appointed Tymoshenko as prime minister of the first post-Orange Revolution government in February 2005, only to dismiss her in September following months of debilitating infighting among coalition members over economic reform and other issues.

The protracted infighting that delayed formation of the new government, as well as its slim two-vote majority, casts doubt on the new governing coalition's durability. The intense maneuvering among faction leaders makes clear they are already seeking to position themselves for the 2009 presidential elections, in which Tymoshenko and Yushchenko could both run as competing reform candidates against former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, whose party again received the single largest number of vote and legislative seats in the national elections.

Foreign policy issues did not play a major role in the 2007 elections, which largely focused on the popularity, integrity, and effectiveness of the country's leading politicians. Tymoshenko, Yanukovich, and Yushchenko all stressed their desire to enjoy good relations with both Russia and the West. They also all endorsed Ukraine's entry into the World Trade Organization and, less realistically for the time being, the European Union. Russian leaders, recognizing that Moscow's heavy-handed intervention in the controversial 2004 presidential elections probably backfired by alienating Ukrainian nationalists and embarrassing Russia when its preferred candidate lost, took care to limit their visible involvement in the 2007 ballot.

On Oct.18, President Vladimir Putin pledged to work with "whatever government emerges in Ukraine, regardless of what political platform it bases its work," because "objective reality will encourage our partners to develop cooperation with Russia." In a subsequent interview with Time magazine, published in the same issue that named him "Person of the Year," the Russian President blamed the United States for exacerbating Ukraine's internal divisions, thereby creating a very dangerous situation: "Everything that's been done there is unconstitutional, which has created distrust among various political groups and citizens, thus undermining Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and economy. That's what the United States has done and is doing in Ukraine and in Georgia. What we say is, leave them alone, without choosing sides." While urging Americans to distance themselves from Ukraine, he also implied that Moscow had certain exclusive interests to defend in the country because "Ukraine is very close to us and because almost half of the population have either friends or relatives in Russia. There are 17 million ethnic Russians there, officially. Almost 100 percent of the people consider Russian as their mother tongue."

Despite Putin's remarks, Tymoshenko's appointment could presage a serious downturn in Russian-Ukrainian relations. In April 2007, Tymoshenko aroused Russian ire by authoring an essay entitled "Containing Russia" in the influential American journal Foreign Affairs. Besides warning of Russian ambitions to achieve regional hegemony, the essay calls on Ukraine to craft initiatives with Western countries aimed at reducing their dependence on Russian energy supplies and to counter other threatening Russian foreign polices. Russian officials responded in kind. For instance, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Tymoshenko of seeking to become the chief ideologue of a new Cold War: "Obviously, it is some kind of an anti-Russian manifesto, an attempt to draw new dividing lines in Europe and bring the world back to the atmosphere of the Cold War."

Upon assuming office on Dec. 18, 2007, Tymoshenko reiterated her intentions to pursue closer ties with the West. She explicitly affirmed her objective to "uphold the ideals of the 2004 Revolution which pledged to move Ukraine closer to the West and eventually seek membership of the European Union and NATO." Polls of Ukrainians indicate a general lack of enthusiasm for NATO membership, with opposition greatest among the Russian-speaking majorities in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian national security establishment has made clear it opposes Ukraine's becoming yet another NATO member on Russia's borders.

Most NATO leaders have signaled they do not envisage Ukraine's joining the alliance anytime soon given the country's limited progress in defense and security sector reform as well as the widespread opposition within Ukraine and its neighbors to its accession. Alliance leaders are content to develop relations further on the basis of the July 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established several subjects for broad if not deep consultation and cooperation -- further defined in the November 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan -- as well as a special NATO-Ukraine Commission to institutionalize the relationship without formal membership. Recent activities have included helping eliminate Ukraine's large stock of surplus conventional weapons and providing language, civics, and other courses to Ukrainian military officers.

It is unclear how serious Tymoshenko and other NATO-leaning Ukrainians are about joining the alliance soon given Ukraine's reliance on Russian energy supplies. Moscow has made clear it can exploit this dependence to punish Ukraine for adopting policies opposed by the Kremlin. The state-controlled natural gas monopoly OAO Gazprom warned immediately after the September 2007 ballot that it might curtail shipments to its Ukrainian customers unless they repay a claimed $1.3 billion debt. Some observers interpreted the move as a preemptive Kremlin warning to the victorious Orange parties not to neglect Russian interests. Gazprom had made evident the credibility of its threats when it cut off deliveries entirely for a few days in January 2006 after Ukraine objected to paying higher prices for its gas purchases.

Yet, Ukraine enjoys some reverse leverage since the two countries remain interdependent in the energy realm. The main Soviet-era pipelines connecting Russian and Central Asian energy supplies to Western Europe pass through Ukraine, resulting in some 80 percent of Russian gas supplies flowing through Ukraine en route to European customers. When Gazprom suspended deliveries in 2006, illicit Ukrainian diversions from the pipeline led to noticeable decreases in the gas supplies reaching many central European countries. Reflecting Ukraine's position, Tymoshenko gave mixed signals during the election campaign. On the one hand, she pledged to "do all it takes to cooperate with Russia in order to have no gas cuts." On the other hand, she said Ukraine should review existing gas deals with Russia and said that the controversial firm RosUkrEnergo, 50 percent of which is owned by Gazprom, should lose its monopoly status as Ukraine's sole energy supplier.

Although the two countries agreed in 1997 on how to divide the Soviet-era Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian government has been trying to increase Russia's rent for continued use of the former Soviet military facilities in and around Sevastopol, which house approximately 14,000 Russian Navy personnel. Moscow annually writes off $97.75 million of Ukraine's state debt to Russia in compensation for the base. Ukrainian authorities have refused Moscow's request to increase the number of Russian diesel submarines based in the Crimea from two to at least a dozen. The two countries also dispute ownership of several offshore lighthouses.

The Ukrainian government has insisted it will not renew the lease when it expires in 2017, leading many to speculate that Russian representatives are seeking to promote leaders in Kiev or the Crimea who will work to amend this provision. In 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated construction of a new base for the Black Sea Fleet at the Russian port of Novorossiisk, which is scheduled for completion in 2012.

Ukrainian nationalists, viewing the Russian military presence on the peninsula as an encroachment on sovereign Ukrainian territory, complain about Russian interference in local affairs. Crimean nationalists, believing that Ukrainian leaders pay insufficient heed to the distinct needs of their population, lobby Moscow to allow the primarily ethnic Russian territory of two million people to rejoin Russia. In the summer of 2006, local protests against the docking of a U.S. Navy ship in the Crimean port of Feodosiya disrupted that year's U.S.-Ukrainian Sea Breeze exercise, an annual event since 1997. The Crimean parliament subsequently voted to declare the peninsula a "NATO-free territory."

Delineating the Russian-Ukrainian maritime border is another issue in which both countries share cooperative and competing interests. Russian and Ukrainian experts continue to discuss the boundaries and permissible uses of the Black Sea, the Azov Sea, and the Kerch Strait. These disputes have not, however, prevented both countries from making progress in negotiations, through the Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission and other mechanisms, on how to manage the fishing, shipping, ecological, and other issues affecting their common maritime zones. Tymoshenko and her team have not given any indication of seeking to suspend these talks.

Source: World Politics Review